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Abstract: This article proposes human security as an analytical framework to understand the current
trends of irregular migration (both forced and unauthorised) in East Asia and revisits the seven pillars
of human security defined in the 1994 Human Development Report by the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP). It explains how the concepts of human security are parallel to those prescribed in
international human rights conventions but different in terms of the attitude towards states. Human se-
curity does not directly challenge state authority and adds a sense of urgency and moral authority that
requires extra-legal measures by the states. The author argues that human security is the securitisation of
human rights and is a better framework and policy discourse than human rights to engage with state and
non-state actors, especially in East Asia where political leaders are more receptive to the former idea. The
study draws examples from stateless Rohingyas, undocumented sex workers in Thailand and Singapore,
trafficked brides from Vietnam and Cambodia, and smuggled North Korean refugees in China to demon-
strate the nexus between human security and irregular migration.
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1. Introduction
In spite of the increasing roles played by individuals and
non-state actors, states still hold the primary responsibil-
ities to protect and guarantee human security of citizens
and residents within their territorial borders. The State
is not just an actor that enacts and amends legislation
on transnational migration between states and implements
policy measures, but is also a structure under which do-
mestic and international, private and public actors, inter-
act with one another. Transnational migration is one such
area where states are the gate-keepers of their own terri-
torial boundaries and provide rules and regulations about
immigration. Cross-border migration can be approached
from different perspectives. While state sovereignty, terri-
torial integrity, national security or criminal justice perspec-
tives represent a conservative voice [1–7], liberal and crit-
ical scholars focus more on individual freedom of move-
ment, the global economic structure and migrants’ socio-
economic conditions [8–10].
This article offers a critical review of different schools
of thoughts on migration and security from conservative,
liberal and critical perspectives, which is followed by a
critical assessment of the Copenhagen School’s securi-
tisation theory. The main purpose of the review is to
examine how academic discourses of international se-
curity have evolved over the years, especially after the
end of the Cold War, from state- and defence-centric to
more people-centred perspectives, merged with other dis-
courses of human rights and sustainable development. Af-
ter an overview of key debates on human security, it ex-
amines the 1994 UNDP definition of the seven pillars of
human security as the most comprehensive and encom-
passing framework. It conceptually dismantles the seven
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pillars—namely personal, community, political, economic,
food health and environmental securities—and shows how
similar the contents of human rights and human security
are. It concludes that human security is the securitisa-
tion of human rights that attaches a sense of urgency and
paramount importance to affected people, regardless of
their legal status, and that requires extra-legal and extra-
political measures by the concerned states.
The study draws on a number of recent examples from
East Asia (both South and North) where migrants risk
their lives to cross the borders through unauthorised land
or sea routes in order to relocate themselves and their
families to more secure places. They include North Ko-
rean ‘smuggled refugees’ [11], undocumented Cambodian
workers and trafficked fishermen in Thailand [12], over-
stayed Bangladeshi workers in Japan [13], stateless Ro-
hingyas [14], trafficked Vietnamese brides in Korea [15]
and Karen refugees in Thailand [16], to name a few. Mi-
grant’ decisions to move across their national boundaries
are driven by their natural instinct for survival to go to a
more secure place even when the movement is unautho-
rised by relevant state authorities. Irregular migration is
a highly complex area of studies as most cases present
mixed migration with multiple causes in a vicious circle. In
other words, a migrant who wanted to escape from poverty
and discrimination, pays for a smuggler to cross the border
and ends up being a victim of human trafficking. Where
s/he is rescued, s/he realises s/he could have claimed
refugee status, so s/he does. Still, s/he has no right to
work. Within the broad category of unauthorised move-
ment, the boundaries and key definitions of irregular migra-
tion (which includes undocumented labour migration, hu-
man trafficking, people smuggling and asylum seeking) are
all blurred and the process of irregular migration is highly
unpredictable.
While migrants are in such dire conditions, the current
human rights framework is insufficient to solve the prob-
lem. According to Article 13(2) of the 1948 Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights, individuals have the right to leave
a country of origin. However, international human rights
law does not provide an express right for the individual to
reside elsewhere nor place a duty upon other states to re-
ceive them. Mobility is therefore incompletely defined and
protected under the existing human rights regime. It is the
states that decide whom they want to receive as residents,
temporary and permanent alike, and accept as citizens.
State obligations to protect and respect basic human rights
of those who are not their citizens have not been properly
observed under international law. In this regard, human
security may offer a powerful language and discourse for
international and regional cooperation to tackle irregular
migration. The term promotes the urgency and paramount
importance attached to affected people regardless of their
legal status, as well as to hosting societies. Human se-
curity highlights the on-going challenge posed by irregular
migration that requires immediate measures by the con-
cerned states that go beyond traditionally defined domestic
rules and regulations on immigration or charitable human-
itarian consideration. By redefining the seven pillars of hu-
man security in the context of irregular migration in East
Asia, the study contributes to the clarity of mixed termi-
nologies and multiple causes of irregular migration as well
as to the growing body of knowledge and theoretical de-
velopment for the existing literature on the nexus between
human insecurity and irregular migration.
2. The Securitisation of Migration
This section critically reviews three main theories of mi-
gration in relation to security. The real world of scholars
and practitioners present a mixture of some of these ba-
sic ideas and the lines among the three schools are highly
blurred (see Table 1 below). Nevertheless, the purpose
here is to provide the most distinctive lines of argument
on this area. Philippe Bourdeau [1] aptly introduces three
models of securitisation of migration. The first and main-
stream model is from the realist tradition of International
Relations (IR). Robert Kaplan [17] warned that Western
states should fear the ‘coming anarchy’ associated with
mass migration while Samuel Huntington [18] declared
that the persistent flow of Hispanic immigrants would con-
stitute a major potential threat to America’s cultural and
political identity. One of the most well-known conserva-
tive migration scholars is Myron Weiner [19] who stated
that ‘advanced industrial countries can protect their bor-
ders from invading armies but not from hordes of individu-
als who slip into harbours, crawl under barbed-wire fences
and wade across rivers’. Weiner’s migration-security nexus
[20] draws what he calls the Security Stability Framework
on how international migration creates conflict within and
between countries from a realist perspective, which sees
migration as a potential threat to national security. For re-
alists, therefore, the expansion of international migration is
dangerous for state sovereignty and the balance of power
among states in the international system and would create
violent conflicts among states [21].
For liberals, on the other hand, national borders should
be open for free trade, labour mobility and individual liberty,
although there are several different sub-groups within the
liberal camp. For example, neoliberals would advocate for
free trade, fewer regulations and unrestricted labour mo-
bility while classical liberals focus on individual liberty, hu-
man rights and justice. Liberal scholars envisage the ‘client
politics model’ [22–24] or the ‘embedded liberalism model’
[25,26], both of which support freedom of movements. In
this liberal perspective, international institutions and inter-
national laws are supposed to set rules and regulations
that respect individual freedom and democracy, and that
contribute to shaping more cooperative and open-minded
state behaviour towards globalisation and international mi-
gration. Free(r) movements, however, on the contrary,
have made many migrant workers’ conditions worse in-
stead of helping them alleviate poverty, underdevelopment
and corruption, an issue which the next group of scholars
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Table 1. Three models of securitisation of migration.
Realism Liberalism Critical Theory
Basic premisses Migration creates conflict within and
between countries. Migration is a po-
tential threat to national security.
National borders should be open for
free markets, labour mobility and indi-
vidual liberty.
Insecurity and fear are mostly imag-
ined and constructed by mundane, bu-
reaucratic practices and decisions of
everyday politics.
International migration affects state
sovereignty, the balance of power
among states, and the nature of vio-
lent conflicts in the international sys-
tem.
The threats realists argue are posed
by migrants can be negated by the
rules and regulations set up by inter-
national institutions and international
law.
Security professionals, conservative
media, nationalist politicians and
xenophobic individuals foster the
creation of fear mongering around
migration.
Scholars Robert Kaplan Gary P. Freeman Didier Bigo
Samuel Huntington Virginie Guiraudon Ole Wæver
Myron Weiner Christian Joppke
address.
Critical theorists oppose both realist and liberal views,
arguing that security is neither about survival nor about ur-
gency and exceptional practices. Rather, security is the
‘result of mundane bureaucratic decisions of everyday pol-
itics that create a sense of insecurity, fear, danger and un-
ease’ [27,28]. Didier Bigo identifies this as the ‘governmen-
tality of unease’. According to him, the securitisation pro-
cess is above all ‘routinised practices of professionals of
security, essentially police and bureaucrats’. This relates
to Ole Wæver’s securitisation theory to identify existential
threats from imagined enemies and to highlight ‘speech
act’. The speech acts are not only done by bureaucrats or
security professionals but also by the conservative media,
nationalist politicians or xenophobic individuals who post
their opinions on the Internet and they spread over a few
minutes across space. The state (or Bigo’s security pro-
fessionals), in this sense, waits until normative equilibrium
is reached in the society and belatedly reacts to social de-
mands in democratic society. Threats may not exist, but
fear does endogenously within individuals living in the sys-
tem of mass migration. It is not just created by external
sources of bureaucrats.
The Copenhagen School, which is part of the critical
theory and is led by Wæver, gives specific methodolog-
ical insights into the securitisation of irregular migration.
Barry Buzan’s Securitisation Theory (ST) [29,30] provides
a framework to theorise how East Asian states are se-
curitising irregular migration and to identify which secu-
rity norms the states are constituting and utilising over the
years. As Bourdeau [1] says, ST is ‘the most widely ap-
plied and fully developed model of relationships between
migration and security’ and a ‘most creative and produc-
tive analytical framework’. Securitisation is, by definition,
the ‘process of integrating migration discursively and insti-
tutionally into security frameworks that emphasise policing
and defence’ [1]. Like social constructivism [31], one of the
greatest strengths of ST is that it shifts the focus of analy-
sis away from merely material factors to socio-cultural and
normative ones.
Wæver [32] himself identifies his own ST as an analy-
sis of ‘actual linguistic practices to see what regulates dis-
course’. The Copenhagen School examines what practi-
tioners ‘do in talking security’. Wæver’s notion of security
is that it is the ‘result of a move that takes politics beyond
the established rules of the game and frames the issue as
above normal politics’, which also applies to human secu-
rity. However, his interpretation of the designation of exis-
tential threat is negative in a sense that it is only to justify
the use of extraordinary measures or special powers such
as enforcement and secrecy. His view of security is a ‘fail-
ure to deal with issues as normal politics’. For Wæver,
therefore, de-securitisation is the optimal long-range solu-
tion, which limits the scope for interpretations of security to
human dimensions.
I would add a new human dimension to Waever’s ST.
There have been changing conceptions of security from
state-centric to people-centred. I would still place this new
dimension under the post-structural critical school as my
version of human security framework is going beyond both
realist/liberal rational theory and instead focusing on non-
linear circular processes of human insecurity and irregular
migration. Previous work on the securitisation of migration
focus on the negative notion of security as urgency, con-
trol and power [23,33]. Maggie Ibrahim [34] for example,
calls the securitisation of migration the ‘latest and most
modern form of racism’. In fact, fear-mongering, criminal
imagery of migrants, witch-hunting or ‘othering’ particular
ethnic groups are old tactics of securitisation of migrants.
However, this limited and negative state-centric perspec-
tive of securitisation does not capture the changed con-
cepts of security in a more humane way and that includes
considerations of the agency of migrants. The Rohingya
boat people crisis in May 2015 also presents multi-faceted
human security issues of irregular migration concerning
the poverty, conflict and discrimination that drive migrants
into the illegal sea routes that are operated by traffickers.
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There is another problem with ST that is the discon-
nection between theory and empirical evidence. As Bigo
[28,35], the founding father of the Paris School, points out,
actual policy practices often reveal patterns different from
those found in official discourses. Many have tried to fill
this gap. Bourdeau [1] brings his own cases from Canada
and France whereas Melissa G. Curley and Wong Siu-lun
[36] provide Northeast Asian case studies. Feminist se-
curity studies offer valuable observations and analyses on
how different forms of migration are securitised or under-
securitised [37–41], which provided inspiration for the cur-
rent study. Migrants’ self-organising behaviour and inter-
actions among themselves and with the state migration
regimes are key to understanding the evolutionary corre-
lation between migration and security.
3. Human Security: Securitisation of Human Rights
As explained above, the conventional notion of security fo-
cuses on national defence, military security or territorial in-
tegrity of sovereign states, virtually synonymous with ‘de-
fence’ [42,43]. Notions of personal, cultural or environmen-
tal security emerged and the reconceptualisation of secu-
rity has been carried out by IR theorists [30,42,44,44–51].
The major breakthrough was the 1994 UNDP report. In
the report, the UNDP laid out two broad categories of hu-
man security: ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’
[52–54]. It argued that ‘human security is not a concern
with weapons—it is a concern with human life and dignity’,
best insured through prevention and people-centeredness.
It detailed seven components of human security: personal,
community, political, economic, food, energy and environ-
ment securities that are interdependent with one another.
Since then, human security has been revisited for fur-
ther investigation for its utility and its relation to other global
political concerns [43,55–57]. Some have a narrow def-
inition of human security as ‘vulnerability to physical vi-
olence during conflict’ [58] while others share a broader
concept, linking it with other areas such as development
or globalisation [59,60], which is often represented as the
Canadian vs. Japanese conceptions of human security
[61]. Ernst Haas [62] long argued that the security litera-
ture needs to learn from the ‘evolutionary epistemology’ of
global life. Similarly, Mark Duffield [63] agrees that human
security provides a means of distinguishing geopolitics, the
security of states, from biopolitics, the security of popula-
tion. For many in East Asia, economic, food, energy and
environmental issues are real and immediate threats to
their peoples’ survival and resilience. Developing countries
like Myanmar, Vietnam, Cambodia, the Philippines and In-
donesia send many economic and marriage migrants over-
seas and migrants send remittance back to their countries
of origin. North Korea has chronic food shortage [64–66].
China, Japan and South Korea started planning to secure
long-term food security, especially rice, and energy secu-
rity, which both involve seasonal labour forces. Japan, In-
donesia and the Philippines are vulnerable to natural dis-
asters such as typhoons, whereas the Greater Mekong re-
gion faces man-made environmental degradation through
mining and dam construction, activities that result in forced
eviction at times.
Each state’s historical (post-colonial), political and cul-
tural backgrounds constitute its attitude to human rights
vs. human security. Many in East Asia were under West-
ern colonial rule (except for Korea which was under the
Japanese rule) and have authoritarian political structures,
which have been deeply embedded in hierarchical male-
dominant role-based cultures or religions. Governments
are under pressure for their lack of transparency and ac-
countability, rising middle-classes or ethnic rivalry. In this
environment, the political elites are more receptive toward
the idea of collective (human) security while being resis-
tant to individual human rights. A state as an actor also
wants to survive as individual migrants do. The former
prime ministers of Singapore and Malaysia, Lee Kuan Yew
and Mahathir bin Mohamad, for example, defined human
rights as Western concepts that were not suitable for many
Asian countries. The former Singaporean foreign minister
Kishore Mahbubani also argues that human rights are an
‘aggressive alien Western concept’ [67]. The default as-
sumption in human rights is that the state is the potential
perpetrator either by committing human rights violations or
by omitting its obligations to protect human rights. State-
society relations are confrontational under the doctrine of
human rights. In the language of human security, however,
states remain the primary guarantors of human security
or providers of goods and services for people’s well-being
while being able to establish normal authority in interna-
tional society by looking after its own people as well as
vulnerable migrants. Having a closer examination of the
contents of the seven pillars of human security endorsed
by the UNDP in 1994 [52], however, I would argue that
they are all within the realm of international human rights
as seen below Table 2.
Whereas human rights challenge state authority and
sovereignty and often accuse states of being potential per-
petrators, human security expects state moral authority,
expands state responsibilities to non-citizens, i.e. vulner-
able migrants regardless of their legal status, and urges
trans-political supra-national measures that go beyond ex-
isting national mechanisms. It is the urgency and the
magnitude of impact on vulnerable irregular migrants that
transcends state sovereignty and territorial integrity and
that can affect hosting societies on a greater scale if no
proper measures are taken in time. This requires immedi-
ate transnational cooperation. In this regard, a good state
may want to seize the opportunity to take ownership of hu-
man security and play a responsible role for the regional
security.
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Table 2. Human Security and Human Rights.
Seven Pillars of
Human Security
International Human Rights Provisions of Human Rights
Treaties
Personal Security The right to life, liberty and security; not to be discriminated, based on race, ethnicity,
language, religion, sex, political opinion or social origin, birth, disability, gender, sexual
orientation; to freedom from violence, torture, slavery, exploitation, arbitrary arrest, or
summary execution; to recognition before the law, fair trial, privacy, family, property,
identity/nationality, movement and residence, gender equality, freedom of thought and
education.
UDHR Articles 1-19, 26; IC-
CPR Articles 2-3, 6-20, 23-
4, 26; ICESCR Articles 2-3,
10, 13-4; CEDAW; CRC; CAT;
and other ILO conventions no
forced labour or child labour
Community Secu-
rity
The right to cultural life; to preserve cultural practices, values or heritage from sec-
tarian violence or not to be discriminated against, based on certain race, ethnicity,
nationality or religion.
UDHR Article 27; ICCPR Ar-
ticle 27; ICESCR Article 15;
CERD; and MWC
Political Security The rights to freedom of assembly, political participation; not to be discriminated
based on political opinion, to vote and to stand for election, to free and fair elec-
tion, to freedom of speech, to form and maintain political organisations, or to organise
social movements.
UDHR Articles 2, 20-21; IC-
CPR Articles 21-22, 25
Economic Security The rights to basic income, social security, work and rest, trade union. UDHR Article 22-4; ICE-
SCR Articles 6-9; and other
ILO conventions on minimum
wage, etc.)
Food Security The rights to adaquate standard of living, freedom from hunger, access to basic food. ICESCR Articles 11
Heath Security The rights to standard of living, health, to be protected from infectious or chronic
diseases and to access health services.
UDHR Article 25; ICESCR Ar-
ticles 12
Environmental Se-
curity
The rights to adaquate standard of living, clothing, housing, and clean environment,
especially water and air, or the right to be protected from man-made environmental
disasters.
ICESCR Articles 11
Unlike the misconceived idea of human rights as an
imperial Western concept among many authoritarian lead-
ers in East Asia, human security has the potential to grow
more as a foreign policy concept. There are signs many
East Asian elites are already receptive to the idea of hu-
man security. Amitav Acharya [68] went even further, ar-
guing that human security is originally an ‘Asian’ concept
as Mahbub ul Haq, who is the main author of detailing the
concepts of human security in the 1994 UNDP report, is
an ‘Asian’ scholar. Japan has initiated the Asian approach
to human security by embracing socio-economic aspects
such as food and energy security in contrast to the Cana-
dian emphasis on the ‘freedom from fear’ in armed conflict.
The Japanese government saw human security compre-
hensively covering ‘all the menaces that threaten human
survival, daily life and dignity—for example, environment
degradation, violations of human rights, transnational or-
ganised crime, illicit drugs, refugees, poverty, anti-personal
landmines and other infectious diseases such as AIDS’
[43,69]. Japan’s comprehensive security, therefore, bears
both a traditional statist notion of closer military coopera-
tion with the US and non-traditional economic, energy and
food security [70]. Although Acharya [68] remains pes-
simistic in arguing that ASEAN countries’ main concern is
regime survival and legitimation as in the case of Singa-
pore’s ‘Total Defence’ [71] rather than genuine concern for
people’s well-being and security, the two are inseparable.
Furthermore, some East Asian leaders embrace and
mobilise human security in their public speeches [72–74]
(on the Asian conception of human security, see: [75,76]).
In 2002, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji and ASEAN lead-
ers jointly declared on cooperation in the field of non-
traditional security at the sixth China-ASEAN Summit in
Phnom Penh, Cambodia. At the Symposium on ‘Realizing
Human Security in Asia’ in Tokyo in 2010, the Secretary-
General of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and
former Thai Foreign Minister, Surin Pitsuwan, endorsed
the concept of human security as ‘a rather comprehen-
sive concept. . . [that]. . . will not be in competition with the
issue of state sovereignty. In fact, it is making the state’s
sovereignty more meaningful because state security and
state sovereignty, also would involve responsibility’ [77].
Pitsuwan also connected the concept to social safety nets
in the wake of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. In the re-
cent publication of the Armed Forces of the Philippines [78]
Internal Peace and Security Plan: Bayanihan, the whole-
of-nation ‘human security’ approaches were identified as
the strategic planning for peace and security, natural dis-
asters and other illicit activities such as human trafficking,
piracy and people smuggling.
4. ‘Human’ Securitisation of Irregular Migration
The final section of the article examines the nexus be-
tween human (in)security and irregular migration. Many
have tried to bring in broader concepts of human secu-
rity in migration studies, rather than traditional national
and border security perspectives. Elspeth Guild and
Joanne van Selm [79] reconceptualise security as ‘po-
litical and legal security’, ‘cultural and identity security’
and ‘personal and economic security’ in their study on
the impact of immigrants on hosting countries. Literature
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on the migration-development nexus [80,81], migration-
development-security [82], and migration-globalisation-
human security [83] employs people-centred security con-
cepts. The nexus between human insecurity and irregu-
lar migration has been observed in the East Asian con-
text. Dewi F. Anwar [84] has tried to weave together the
ideas of human rights, security and irregular migration. In
particular, she identified new threats to human security as
the exploitation of irregular workers, the growing incidence
of people smuggling and human trafficking. However, An-
war did not concretise the contents of human security and
used the term with ‘non-traditional’ security interchange-
ably, which made the concept very vague. With further em-
bodiment and comparison with established international
human rights norms, the UNDP’s human security lens can
provide an alternative agent-based analysis for the moti-
vations of migrants, the vulnerability they face as well as
the potential or imagined threats they pose to hosting soci-
eties.
Human (in)security has been the main driver for irregu-
lar migration. Because of their irregular status, migrants’
human security comes under greater threat (no matter
where they end up), which feeds into the vicious cycle
of insecurity-triggered migratory patterns. Unless this vi-
cious circle is broken by urgent extra-legal measures by
the concerned states, both vulnerable migrants and host-
ing societies can end up in highly insecure situations. In
spite of the greater risk that irregular migration poses for
all societies, the term ‘irregular migration’ has been associ-
ated with the illegality of people’s movements. It is labelled
clandestine, illegal, sans papier (undocumented), uncon-
trolled, unlawful, unauthorised, alien without residence sta-
tus, or non-compliant. In 1974, the United Nations made
the first reference to irregular migration in connection with
the treatment of ‘illegal aliens’ [85]. In the following year,
the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 3449 (30)
where it called on the UN system to use the term ‘non-
documented’ or ‘irregular’ in official documents rather than
‘illegal’ migrants. The International Organization for Mi-
gration defines irregular migration as the ‘movement that
takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending,
transit and receiving countries’. I would define irregular mi-
gration as emerging patterns of people’s mobility that does
not conform to established rules, norms, customs or moral-
ity, which include unauthorised illegal migration as well as
forced migration. Following Martin Ruhs and Bridget An-
derson’s compliance approach [86], ‘unauthorised’ here
has two meanings: one is movement that has not abided
by existing migration regulations in a given state and the
other is that states do not have laws (yet) to regulate illicit
migration. For this article, people ‘affected’ [87] by irregu-
lar migration fall into four categories: 1) unregistered, over-
stayed or misusing-visa labour migrants; 2) asylum seek-
ers, stateless people, or IDPs; 3) trafficked persons or 4)
smuggled people. In reality, however, these four categories
are blurred and cross-boundary: undocumented Cambo-
dian fishermen become easy targets for traffickers [88] and
North Korean asylum seekers in China get ‘help’ from mis-
sionary smugglers to use the underground railway to cross
the border to Southeast Asia [89].
East Asia produces a large number of irregular mi-
grants inter-regionally but also intra-regionally. Border con-
trols are not rigidly enforced in certain places due to geo-
graphical challenges or the lack of government capacity.
East Asia’s diverse and vibrant environments create intra-
regional migration for labour, sex, marriage or freedom.
East Asia has high degrees of demographic, political, eco-
nomic, socio-cultural and ethnic diversity, which makes the
cross-border movements more frequent and fluid as in dif-
fusion and osmosis in physics. In China, it has the world’s
biggest population of 1.38 billion and one of the smallest,
Brunei with only 412,000 in 2012 [90]. In terms of income,
East Asia has the lowest GDP per capita of Lao PDR (US$
751) and the highest of Japan (US$ 37,433) in 2013 [91].
In the Golden Triangle, the Balkans of Asia, there are nu-
merous ethnic minorities sharing the national borders be-
tween Thailand, Myanmar and Lao for trade or employ-
ment. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM)
[92] recognises that irregular migration remains one of the
biggest challenges across the region ‘with the most com-
mon forms being unauthorised labour migration movement
and trafficking for labour and sexual exploitation, some-
times through international marriages’. The following sub-
sections will introduce a few exemplary cases of irregular
migration in relation to human (in)security, based on the
author’s own reading, observation and fieldwork in the re-
gion for the past decade. The list is not exhaustive.
5. Asylum Seeking
In forced migration, personal, community, political and en-
vironmental insecurities (physical safety, ethnic and polit-
ical violence as well as natural disasters and man-made
environmental damages) push migrants to neighbouring
countries. Many ethnic minorities such as the Karen, Mon
or Rohingya peoples escape from state-induced discrimi-
nation and armed conflict in Burma to neighbouring coun-
tries such as Thailand and Malaysia through whatever pos-
sible land and sea routes, despite the fact they are unau-
thorised channels (fieldwork in Ban Dong Yang and Mae
La camps in Thailand and focus group interviews with 58
refugees in total between 2013 and 2015). Some pay for
smugglers to get them out of situations of violence and
poverty. Others are deceived by human traffickers and kept
in confinement until ransom is paid or until they are sold
for sex or labour exploitation. North Koreans also escape
from state-induced political violence, food and economic
insecurity, and severe floods and draught in the 1990s.
They head to China and then down to Thailand, Vietnam
or Cambodia, knowing that the border crossing is illegal
both in sending and receiving countries (fieldwork in Yan-
bien, China in 1999, Seoul, South Korea in 2000–2005 and
Bangkok, Thailand in 2012).
International human rights or refugee laws have been
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ineffective in responding to imminent threats to asylum
seekers and hosting populations as the states concerned
do not fully respect human rights norms and instead pri-
oritise sovereignty and national security. Burma, North Ko-
rea, China, Vietnam and Cambodia have the worst records
of state compliance with international human rights and
they are not bound by humanitarian or refugee conventions
either. Under international law, none of the concerned
countries show commitment to the respect for, or protec-
tion of, human rights for those vulnerable asylum seekers.
These states merely treat these vulnerable individuals as
illegal migrants who violate domestic immigration regula-
tions. This does not deter asylum seekers from leaving
their countries of origin (because it does not address the
original issue of insecurity that pushes irregular migration),
but it does encourage underground smuggling networks to
grow, which places the migrants in greater danger.
Because of the precarious and illegal status of asylum
seekers and the lack of sufficient government measures,
migrants’ food, health, environment and community secu-
rities are at stake in hosting countries (lack of access to
basic food, exposure to unhygienic environments and com-
municable diseases, discrimination against certain ethnic
groups or threats from locals to report to the authorities).
For Karen refugees, Thailand offered temporary shelter for
more than a decade where refugees received food, health
services, basic education and vocational training. In the
case of North Korean asylum seekers, China has turned
a blind eye and they remain in the hands of underground
Christian missionaries or smugglers. The existence of asy-
lum seekers and refugees often creates diplomatic ten-
sion between sending and receiving countries. Burma and
Thailand have regular dialogues how to handle the Karen
refugees. Vietnam once sent 486 North Koreans in a char-
tered Korean Air flight to South Korea and North Korea
publicly condemned the decision. While Thailand allows
some Karen refugees to remain as residents, China repa-
triates North Koreans and tightens border control, based
on the bilateral agreement with North Korea. The latter
case opens underground smuggling and trafficking net-
works that can penetrate borders, which only make both
migrants and citizens more vulnerable and place regional
security in greater danger. As China closes the borders
with North Korea, the region’s economy slows down and
community cohesion is disturbed [93]. Trafficking in per-
sons and people smuggling occur in commercial land and
sea routes [94]. Turbulent and poorly managed borders
can also attract other related criminal activities such as
goods smuggling and fraud [95] that have impact on not
just asylum seekers but the hosting populations.
6. Undocumented Labour Migration
The next group is undocumented labour migrants who
seek better economic security and knowingly violate im-
migration rules and work permit requirements. These are
mostly unskilled workers and they make up the largest
number of migrant workers in Asia [96]. There are no fixed
sending or receiving countries. A decision to move to an-
other country to find work is relative and non-linear. Deci-
sions are made through interactions with migrants’ neigh-
bours, families and friends. Employment agencies play a
significant role and some have exploitative practices that
are not regulated by states. While existing flows from coun-
tries like Bangladesh, Indonesia and the Philippines are
constant, migrant workers from Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos
and Burma have also entered the global labour market.
Among economic migrants who come with proper visas,
many become irregular as they overstay or misuse visas.
Up to one in four migrant workers in Asia may have illegal
status [97]. According to the International Labour Organ-
isation [97], labour flows from Indonesia and Thailand to
Malaysia are largely illegal and Thailand hosts up to 1.7
million illegal workers. Undocumented migrants have no
access to justice and are not entitled to legal protection
from abuse, the non-payment of salaries. Bangladeshi or
Nepalese factory workers in Japan overstay and become
illegal migrants [98]. Cambodian seasonal workers cross
the border to Thailand without proper travel documents or
work permits [99]. Philippine sex workers enter Singapore
with social visit passes and solicit in streets or bars (field-
work in Singapore in 2012 and in-depth interviews with
eight sex workers). They are targets of police raids and
arrested for the breach of immigration rules.
States treat them as illegal migrants who breach the na-
tional laws on immigration and work permits. Furthermore,
the growth of irregular migration in East Asia is linked to
both governments’ unwillingness to effectively manage mi-
gration and to employers’ desire for cheap labour [100].
Most Asian countries have tended to turn a blind eye to
undocumented workers at times of economic growth and
to campaigns of mass expulsion in economic downturns.
These workers have no recourse or access to justice when
their rights are violated. Hosting countries do not recognise
their legal rights as the latter has no legal standing in the
country of their residence. International human rights laws
do little to protect irregular migrant workers. Most countries
that host undocumented migrant workers have not signed
or ratified the International Convention on the Protection of
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their
Families [101].
In the meantime, the very presence of undocumented
labour migrants in a country, when not properly managed,
poses potential threats to personal, community, economic,
food, health and environmental securities for hosting so-
cieties. The public is exposed to health hazards from un-
managed epidemic or transmittable diseases through hu-
man contact because irregular migrants share the same
space as host societies. Undocumented migrants are not
covered by national healthcare systems. Accumulated
grievances may trigger communal violence against the lo-
cal population. Leaving undocumented migrant workers
unprotected can create long-term socio-economic prob-
lems for hosting societies. Many governments, however,
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tend to focus on their illegal status and the deportation of
these workers once caught no matter how long they have
contributed to the hosting country’s economy. Repatria-
tion may provide the concerned government a short-term
cost-effective solution. However, in the long run, exploita-
tion and unfair treatment can bring about unintended diplo-
matic and political conflict between the sending and receiv-
ing countries.
7. Trafficking in Persons and People Smuggling
The third and fourth categories of irregular migrants are
people who are affected by human trafficking and people
smuggling. They include victims, survivors, their families,
brokers, aid workers and anyone who migrate or have mi-
grated to transport other people for the purposes of ex-
ploitation or for pure financial gain. These two terms are
often confused. The former involves a form of exploita-
tion in the final destination and can happen within a na-
tional boundary whereas the latter refers to the movement
of people from one country to another through an unau-
thorised channel. In the case of trafficking, individual traf-
fickers can be charged for their criminal activity. States
can also be held responsible for failing to protect the hu-
man rights of trafficked persons. Smuggling, however, is
defined as a transnational organised crime and no state
is legally responsible for the protection of smuggled peo-
ple unless they prove themselves exploited by smugglers
or seek political refuge. Vulnerable populations who live
in zones of conflict and poverty become targets of traf-
fickers for exploitation. Young people are particularly vul-
nerable. North Korean women and women from refugee
camps in Thailand are sold and resold to Chinese men as
wives for sexual exploitation and domestic servitude [94].
Young Vietnamese and Cambodian women are arranged
to marry South Korean, Japanese and Taiwanese men
through international match-making agencies who work for
profit [15]. Many of them are confined at home with their
passports confiscated by their husbands. Uneducated and
poor women and children from Burma and Indonesia work
as domestic workers in Singapore, often not paid for sev-
eral months or years because of the money they owe the
employment agencies. They are also verbally and phys-
ically abused by their employers and denied their day-off
from work [102]. Their movements are managed by profit-
oriented employment or marriage agencies.
While not denying irregular migration has to be solved
in part through the prosecution of organised criminals and
protection of victims, it is also a serious human problem
that needs to be seen from the agent’s perspective rather
than treating them merely as criminals/victims and putting
them in prisons/shelters. Poverty, lack of education and so-
cial stigma are identified as causes of trafficking in persons
[103,104]. There are also other facilitating factors such
as a symbiotic relationship between established (legalised)
and underground (criminalised) sectors [105]. Without as-
sistance from local security guards, police and other law
enforcement officials, irregular migration would be impos-
sible. Trafficked or smuggled migrants, because of their
precarious legal status, are exposed to the great risk of ex-
ploitation, fear of deportation, physical and mental abuses
and other human rights violations and discrimination.
Human rights are not likely to be a dominant foreign
policy norm in the region. While only the Philippines and
Indonesia are signatories to the International Convention
of the Protection of Migrant Workers and Their Families,
many East Asian countries have ratified the Convention
against Transnational Organised Crime and its protocols
on human trafficking and people smuggling [106]. A rare
occasion states act together is the recent migrant smug-
gling incidents at sea [107]. It was security not human
rights that made states respond to the crisis. International
news cover the stories of stranded migrants at sea from
Burma, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka which include all four
irregular migrant groups I have described earlier in this pa-
per. For example, they include Rohingya asylum seekers,
many of whom are victims of human trafficking, and smug-
gled Bangladeshi migrants, who were to be undocumented
migrant workers. The only two Muslim-majority countries,
Malaysia and Indonesia, offered temporary shelters while
the Thai, Singaporean and Australian governments turned
them away [108]. International humanitarian or human
rights laws do little to change state behaviour when they
collide with notions of state sovereignty and territorial in-
tegrity. The urgency human security attaches to stress the
magnitude of impact on human lives has a better chance
to induce state action.
8. Conclusion
Irregular migration is a transnational human security prob-
lem that requires urgent extra-legal measures and goes
beyond normal politics. International human rights norms
have not been so effective as to induce state action to pro-
tect vulnerable migrants as well as hosting societies. For
this reason, this article went in search for a more appro-
priate discourse that could capture the nature and impact
of irregular migration on people. It found the 1994 UNDP’s
seven pillars of human security most comprehensive and
also parallel to the norms of international human rights
with changing state responsibilities. The multifaceted 1994
UNDP framework moves away from the narrow vs. broad
concepts of human security and helps better understand
the causes and consequences as well as the constitutive
processes of irregular migration. Human security does not
challenge state sovereignty as much as the language of
human rights appears to, but gives states greater owner-
ship over the causes and consequences of human insecu-
rity and the opportunity to exercise moral authority in in-
ternational relations. It therefore has a better chance to
induce state action than the existing human rights regime,
especially in the East Asian context. This comprehensive
human security approach to irregular migration stands a
better chance than the narrow criminal justice or individu-
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alistic human rights perspectives.
This article identifies the lack of personal, economic,
food and environmental securities as the main drivers for ir-
regular migration. Migrants move across their national bor-
ders to find a safer place for their survival, very often know-
ing that the way to do so is not authorised by the relevant
migration regimes. They may reside in foreign countries
without proper permits or with misused documents. The
act of irregular migration, which is often forced by states or
prompted by other profit-minded individuals or corrupt gov-
ernment officials, puts migrants under a new set of human
insecurities not just for migrants themselves but also for
hosting populations. Human insecurity caused by irregular
migration is not a matter of migrants vs. citizens but a mat-
ter for all migrants and citizens. Human security provides a
better normative framework to understand the motivations
and human costs of irregular migration. Each trajectory of
irregular migration has its own path dependency, learning
curves, interactions with other stakeholders such as fami-
lies, brokers, smugglers, employers or immigration officers,
and feedback loops. Irregular migration is a complex sys-
tem where a large number of heterogeneous agents are
interacting with one another in a highly unpredictable man-
ner.
The current study introduces a number of case stud-
ies from East Asia. However, the implications described
above can be universal. While being careful about pro-
viding concrete policy recommendations, I would argue re-
strictive immigration rules and political measures do not
solve the problem. In fact, they drive migration under-
ground and deepen human insecurity for vulnerable mi-
grants and their hosts. Open borders do not automatically
solve the problem, either. Open borders are highly unlikely,
especially in Northeast Asia where North Korea is testing
its nuclear and missile programmes. Even in Southeast
Asia, the idea of open borders for a common market can
only be realised in the distant future because of the income
gap between the most and least developed countries in
the region. Open borders without access to justice and
information, socially responsible businesses and compe-
tent civil society will only drive already vulnerable migrants
into increasingly exploitative environments. Providing ba-
sic food, healthcare and clean living conditions, regardless
of a person’s legal status, is not just moral and humanitar-
ian for all irregular migrants but would also be beneficial for
better human security of the hosting society, too.
With growing human insecurity not just caused by po-
litical violence but more and more by non-political factors
such as poverty, underdevelopment, extremism, inequal-
ity, social exclusion, and environmental damage, schol-
ars and practitioners in the field need to be able to un-
derstand the dynamic and complex nature of irregular mi-
gration. The process is not linear but highly unpredictable
and constitutive. One such case is the growing number
of environmental refugees who are not recognised by the
1951 Refugee Convention or by any international protec-
tion regimes. More people are displaced by natural disas-
ters, which immediately place those affected under highly
vulnerable food, shelter, health and environmental condi-
tions. These conditions subsequently lead to more seri-
ous and detrimental long-term economic deprivation and
lack of education. IDPs and refugees then become targets
for traffickers. Otherwise, those with resources flee using
migrant smugglers and become undocumented labour mi-
grants elsewhere. As I reiterated in this article, the criteria
of irregular migration is extremely blurred in real life. The
media and policy-makers are better informed by clear ter-
minologies and types of irregular migrants laid out in this
article so that when we have a refugee crisis, we do not
call it a migrant crisis, or we do not call what is human traf-
ficking migrant smuggling any more.
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